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Abstract 
This paper revisits one of the classic debates on world capitalist development – the 
‘transition to capitalism’ debate framed in Robert Brenner’s classic critique of World 
Systems and Dependency Theory. 
It was originally presented to the July 2007 conference of the International 
Confederation for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE) and in a slightly modified form, 
to the September 2007 conference of the UK Political Studies Association. 
The paper argues that the 1970s discussion was founded on an deeply flawed 
understanding of the mechanisms by which modern capitalist production relations 
produce what is termed ‘backwardness’. 
Economics has failed to develop an adequate explanation for the most persistent 
phenomenon of the modern world – the polarisation of the world’s national 
economies, grouped within two great and remarkably geographically stable blocs. 
The reason, I argue in this paper, is the general equilibrium paradigm which predicts 
that modern capitalist production, left to its own devices, must necessarily even out 
national differences in productivity, wages, and profits over time. However the 
reverse happens, and development theory is deprived of an adequate explanation for 
national differentiation in terms of the ordinary mechanisms of the capitalist market. 
This loss is compounded by parallel failure within Marxist value theory. The paper 
locates the origin of this failure within the systematic replacement of this theory by an 
equilibrium re-interpretation of it, converting it into a variant of the very orthodoxy to 
which it was supposed to offer an alternative. 
The paper assesses the skewed character which results, in contemporary accounts 
(both within and outside economics) of development, dependency, inequality  and 
imperialism. These are driven to assign inappropriate weight to ‘political and 
‘cultural’ mechanisms or to classify the economic circumstances of the poor nations 
as in some sense exceptional or abnormal for capitalism.  The idea that 
underdevelopment – ‘backwardness’ – is a failure to catch up or an absence of 
modernity, has thus become the conceptual framework for discussing the national 
difference produced by modernity.  
This is particularly clear in the evidently symbiotic and mutually conditioned 
development of slavery in the USA and the Industrial Revolution (with Cotton at its 
centre) in theUK. Antebellum slavery, once the economic mechanisms are clarified, 
can be understood not as a backward survival from a precapitalist era, but a product of 
modern capitalism itself. 
This principle is a general one. ‘Backwardness’, I argue, is a disguised outcome of the 
most modern of all economic processes – the constant technical revolutions that 
characterise industrial capitalism. 
Keywords: Brenner, World Systems Theory, Dependency Theory, Development, 
Globalization, TSSI 
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The modernity of backwardness 
Alan Freeman, University of Greenwich, April 2007 
The persistence of backwardness 
This paper is about development. It deals with three widely separated discussions, in 
each of which people seem to ask the same question: why do things which their age 
calls ‘backward’ coincide with, and indeed outstrip in extent, the things they call 
‘modern’? What, for example, was responsible for the slave trade? Why is poverty not 
history? What leads supposedly liberal nations to construct despotic empires? Why is 
every war more barbaric than the last? Where did the Holocaust come from? Such 
events call into question such basic enlightenment ideas as progress and modernity. 
Two different answers keep surfacing. One – without which ‘underdevelopment’ 
loses any real meaning – is that backwardness is a survival, arising from the absence 
or late arrival of modernity. A very different idea comes forward during great 
upheavals: that backwardness is a product or feature of modernity, something it 
brings in its wake or indeed, constructs in order to survive. 
Why return now to issues which have not been discussed for thirty years? Because 
backwardness is back. Wars of conquest and occupation are fast becoming standard 
policy. Quaint 19th century practices like imperialism, racial segregation, and torture 
are being reconsidered, and values established by the enlightenment itself are in 
question: religious toleration, fair trial, and equality under the law. 
Such ideas are advanced in the most self-proclaimed ‘modern’ world powers – yet 
they come from the past. At the top of the civilised world’s agenda we find practices 
which, only decades ago, it treated as relics. Modernity is, in short, calling its own 
credentials into question. Time to revisit, therefore, those previous occasions on 
which these credentials were last studied critically. 
This paper revisits three such debates: the Dobb-Sweezy-Brenner-Wallerstein 
controversy on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the ‘dependency’ debate of 
the 1970s, and a debate which both determined the reality of the 20th and shaped its 
thought, on the origin and cause of the 19th century European empires. I have three 
aims. The first is to suggest behind the persistence of the question of backwardness, 
there lie real material causes. I propose re-opening an old enquiry, initiated by Marx 
and pursued by writers as diverse as Weber, Schumpeter, Spengler, and Rostow: are 
there, despite all differences between ages, general historical laws governing the 
evolution of society and its transition from one state to another? 
My second aim is to demonstrate just such a law, and show that economists have lost 
sight of the forces behind world history by their refusal to acknowledge this law. The 
law is that capitalist development is driven by the pursuit of surplus profit – a profit 
above the average, and not, as maintained by all equilibrium-based theories including 
modern academic Marxism – by the pursuit of an average or ideal equilibrium profit.  
Surplus profit is the mechanism that has placed the labour of the periphery at the 
service of the capital of the metropolis. Contemporary history can be understood, I 
will argue, as an organised battle to monopolise particular sources of excess profit – 
mercantile, technical, and financial – for the benefit of blocs or alliances of capitalists. 
This situates, and largely explains, not only the persistence of backwardness in the 
periphery but the history of pre- and postwar relations between the great powers. 
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My third aim is to reinstate the role of the state in transition. A particular feature of 
modernity is the separation of economics from politics and the emergence of two 
complementary institutions: the world market, transcending all state boundaries, and a 
system of national states. The way social formations develop, early thinkers and 
particularly Marx stressed, depends on the way these interact. Events now show that 
the globalisers have prematurely shelved this classical conception, which is also 
disconcertingly absent from the recent debate, from which this paper begins, on the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
Probably the three most important immediate determinants of Europe’s transition to 
capitalism were the Dutch, English and French revolutions. Equally, the defining 
events of the economic shape of late modern times were the formation and overthrow 
of the European empires. In present times the same role is played by the government 
of the United States of America. I do not think we can understand how the world is 
evolving without recognising that every decisive transition is accomplished by a 
reorganisation of the system of national states as a whole, which the globalisers have 
mistaken for their abolition. Moreover at such times, conscious intervention affects 
whether the world emerges better or worse from such convulsions. Historical choices 
exist: it is hence critical to understand the economic laws which shape them. 
Space does not permit me to address a fourth issue of equal importance which I hope 
other contributors will address. This is the alternation of prolonged periods of rise and 
decline in the world economy. This takes the form of periodic surges in new sources 
of surplus profit, alternating with periodic long declines driven by falling profit rates – 
another phenomenon not explicable within an equilibrium framework. The interaction 
of these two general economic laws with political institutions gives rise to the 
convulsive reorganisations of the system of national states which we perceive as 
transitions: each produces the new forces of human potential which each age calls 
modernity, yet at the very same time unleashes on the majority of humans the ever 
greater heights of barbarity, brutality, and suffering which we call backwardness. 
The debate on transition  
This paper revisits Brenner’s 1974 critique of Wallerstein’s Modern World System, a 
critique extending to a current usually called the ‘dependency school’, notably 
Gunder-Frank and Emmanuel.1  This recent discussion deals with the most distant 
moment in history, namely, the transition from feudalism to capitalism. However it 
also served as a proxy for a more modern debate on the causes of third world 
economic backwardness.  Brenner objects to two linked (though in principle 
separable) theses which he finds in the works of these writers: 
(1) that capitalism was made possible in Europe only by its domination of the 
world market and its exploitation of the colonies. 
(2) that ‘underdevelopment’ outside Europe arose not from a lack of capitalism, 
but from exposure to it. 
For Wallerstein and Frank, capital industrialised Europe by barbarising the rest of the 
world. Reserving the economic benefits of trade for itself, and reorganising the social 
structure of its colonies to complement its own, European capital laid the foundations 
of its own modern industry. But to do so, it imposed in the colonies property and 
labour relations such as slavery, peonage, and dynastic landownership which, under 
the banner of the enlightenment, it was busily eliminating from its own heartlands.  
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Brenner characterises this as ‘neo-Smithian Marxism’. He means, or rather alleges, 
that these writers view a world market as sufficient for capitalism to develop, even if 
the goods sold on it are not produced by capitalists. Capitalism, he counters, is more 
than the sale of goods; It is also a way of producing them. It exists only when 
everything used in production comes itself from the market, including labour power, 
sold for money wages, and means of production, purchased with money capital. At 
this point, direct ‘forced labour’ is not needed to extract surplus value from labourers, 
because the market itself compels them to provide it in order to secure a wage. 
He also seems to identify capitalism ‘proper’ with a further development: with 
innovation and constant revolutions in technique.2 From this he deduces, if I 
understand right, that with modern industry, capitalists need not force workers to 
work longer in order to increase their profits: they can innovate instead. This does not 
prevent backwardness – in this context, forced labour – but severs it from any causal 
connection to modernity. In the context of the debate on transition, this leads Brenner 
to conclude that  European industrialisation was autonomous from colonial 
backwardness. Each had its own dynamic but neither was ‘caused by’ the other. This 
idea, repeated in many places, is summarised in this passage: 
Wallerstein[‘s]…entire theoretical edifice is designed to buttress a fundamental 
conclusion: that capitalist development and underdevelopment are the opposite sides of 
the same coin. The logic of this position, as Wallerstein is fully aware, is that capitalist 
underdevelopment is as much the cause of capitalist development, as capitalist 
development is the cause of capitalist underdevelopment. Such an argument is not 
compatible with the view of capitalist economic development as a function of the 
tendency toward capital accumulation via innovation, built into a historically developed 
structure of class relations of free wage labour. For from this vantage point, neither 
economic development nor underdevelopment are directly dependent upon, caused by, 
one another. Each is the product of a specific evolution of class relations, in part 
determined historically ‘outside’ capitalism, in relationship with non-capitalist modes. 
To take the view that development and underdevelopment are indeed directly mutually 
determining, Wallerstein resorts to the position that both development in the core and 
underdevelopment in the periphery are essentially the result of a process of transfer of 
surplus from periphery to core. He must thus end up by essentially ignoring any inherent 
tendency of capitalism to develop the productive forces through the accumulation of 
capital, in favour of a view which sees such development in the core as a result of a 
‘primitive accumulation of capital’ extracted from the periphery, and which sees 
underdevelopment as a result of ‘lack of capital’. Capitalism thus appears to be 
essentially one more system based primarily on the extraction of what we have called 
absolute surplus labour. Brenner (1974:pp60-61) 
Brenner thus appears to argue that capitalism triumphed when and because it could 
innovate. All ‘unfree’ labour relations, he implies, are doomed once capital makes this 
discovery. The first and second industrial revolutions therefore sound the death knell 
of all previous classes, property relations and ways of organising production. 
This raises the central question of the transition discussion: if industrial capitalism 
laid the basis for abolishing all prior labour relations, why did they, apparently, 
become more extended at the very same time that capitalism takes shape? Both 
Wallerstein and Brenner are exercised to explain institutions such as Latifundism, 
what Wallerstein terms ‘enforced cash-crop production’, the 18th Century 
‘refeudalisation’ of Eastern Europe, and not least, slavery. 
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The debate on development 
The above constitutes the formal, textually apparent content, of the debate. Yet as the 
protagonists state, this discussion was a proxy for a contemporary discussion: the 
‘dependency’ debate of the 1970s.  
Brenner’s intervention on this matter, which is mostly in his conclusion, takes the 
form of a debate on revolutionary strategies which, thirty years on, lends it a faintly 
surreal air. He supports Wallerstein and the ‘Annales’ school of historians in seeking 
to escape the sterility of the ‘stages’ theory of history promulgated at the time by 
official Marxism.  But, he argues, the dependency school’s theories will lead to the 
the class struggle in the periphery separating off form that in the metropolis, autarky 
as the solution to underdevelopment and, more dangerous still, nationalist sentiments 
will be exploited to further degrade conditions in the third world: 
[S]o long as incorporation into the world market/world division of labour is seen 
automatically to breed underdevelopment, the logical antidote to capitalist 
underdevelopment is not socialism, but autarky. So long as capitalism develops merely 
through squeezing dry the ‘third world’, the primary opponents must be core versus 
periphery, the cities versus the countryside—not the international proletariat, in alliance 
with the oppressed people of all countries, versus the bourgeoisie. In fact, the danger 
here is double-edged: on the one hand, a new opening to the ‘national bourgeoisie’; on 
the other hand, a false strategy for anticapitalist revolution.  
True, bourgeois revolutions are not on the agenda. International capitalists, local 
capitalists and neo-feudalists alike have remained, by and large, interested in and 
supportive of the class structures of underdevelopment. Nevertheless, these structures 
have kept significant masses of use value in the form of labour power and natural 
resources from the field of capital accumulation. Until recently, of course, the class 
interests behind ‘industrialization via import substitution’ have not, as a rule, been strong 
enough to force the class structural shifts that would open the way to profitable 
investment in development. However, with contracting profit opportunities in the 
advanced industrial countries and the consequent drive for new markets and cheap 
labour power, potentially available in the underdeveloped world, such interests may now 
receive significant strength from unexpected quarters. Should a dynamic of 
‘development’ be set in motion as a consequence—and that is far from certain—it could 
hardly be expected to bring much improvement to the working population of the 
underdeveloped areas, for its very raison d’ être would be low wages and a politically 
repressed labour force. But this would in no way rule out its being accomplished under a 
banner of anti-dependency, national development and anti-imperialism. 
History is full of surprises. The actual outcome of the period was the opposite of what 
Brenner feared. ‘Significant masses of use value’ of the third world were indeed 
seized on by the metropolis, not through an autarkic and nationalist process but its 
opposite, the  ‘neoclassical counterrevolution’, evangelical globalisation, and twenty-
five years of neoliberal policies. Still it is worth noting a continuity, however 
unintentional, between the theoretical position which Brenner himself outlines, and 
the views of the evangelical globalisers – not a few of which, it should be noted, came 
from the left. If in fact industrial capitalism is a sufficient condition to eliminate 
backwardness, it makes a great deal of sense to propose to backward countries that 
their best hope lies in the maximum possible exposure to it, by the fullest possible 
integration into the market, the greatest possible penetration of private capital into 
protected state industries, and the greatest freedom of access to global capital markets.  
Conversely, if Brenner’s basic thesis is correct, ceteris paribus one should expect that 
such policies would lead to development and most important, a reduction of 
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backwardness, measurable as the gap between the most advanced and the least 
advanced in terms of productive capability. The problem is, as we shall see, is that 
exactly the opposite has happened. The recent irruption of global capital markets into 
the third world more than doubled the disparity between the two parts of the world. 
Consequently, though the policies of the globalisers were of course not proposed by 
Brenner, the outcome of their policies constitute important empirical evidence against 
his thesis, which is one of the important reasons to revisit it. We shall return to this 
point also. 
The underlying issue in the debate of the time can nevertheless be detached from the 
somewhat doctrinal discussion in which it was embedded, and rescued for our present 
less revolutionary times: it concerned the contemporary class structure and economic 
position of the periphery. 
There were two standpoints in the dependency debate. The dominant view saw 
underdevelopment was a lack of modernity  As the word  itself suggests, it is 
primarily a failure to keep up: a failure to industrialise, a failure to abandon pre-
capitalist class relations, a failure to integrate into the world market. The dependency 
school held, in one way or another, that underdevelopment was an imposition of 
modernity, a condition imposed by development in the metropolis, succinctly 
expressed in the title of Gunder Frank’s (1969) Development of Underdevelopment.  
It is striking that neither side in the debate saw any real problem in applying, as if 
directly historically relevant, the experience of the most distant period of capitalism to 
its most recent state. This suggests that they considered, in fact took for granted, that 
the same causal factors were at work over the whole of this time. Thus they were 
really discussing was not merely one rather distant period of capitalist history or even 
two widely separated periods, but forces and processes governing the whole of the 
evolution of capitalism 
This makes it very odd that neither side refers to the main thing that happened 
between these two periods, namely imperialism. From about 1870 onwards all 
European powers turned to world conquest, completely dividing the world’s 
territories between them and definitively establishing the class structures of the four-
fifths of humanity now known as the ‘global south’. 
The significance for both dependency and transition should be obvious, since it 
happened after one of them and before the other. Might it not shed some light on the 
nature of early capitalism? Might it not offer some explanation of colonial structures 
today? The reader returning to this debate cannot but be struck that both Brenner and 
Wallerstein write as if the world order passed directly from the early 17th century 
feudalism to late 20th century modernity without the theoretically inconvenient 
interregnum created by dividing the world, fighting two wars over it, and fascism. 
This leads us to consider the third, loudly silent debate of the exchange: empire, by 
which I mean neither Wallerstein’s ‘world empires’ of antiquity and pre-modern 
times, nor the colonialism of early modernity, nor Negri and Hardt’s eponymous but 
fictitious empire of today, but the modern constructions that were actually called by 
that name: those of the age of imperialism. 
The debate on Empire 
The irruption of empire drew a final line across all existing enlightenment projects. It 
lead to the death or marginalisation of European liberalism, opening the way to 
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Nazism; it led to the collapse and complete restructuring, under Russian leadership, of 
the Marxist movement, and finally, it led to the two great movements that actually 
shaped the twentieth century, namely Bolshevism in Russia and Wilsonian Liberalism 
in the USA.  
In order to draw useful conclusions it is exceptionally important to wrench this past 
debate free of all doctrinal preconceptions. I think the best way to do this is to 
understand it primarily as an enormous crisis of the enlightenment at every 
conceivable level.  
In a very real sense, both modern marxism and modern liberalism have their origin 
not in the enlightenment or the heyday of capitalist industrialisation, but in the 
attitudes and response of both marxists and liberals to an unparalleled and – for both 
of them – totally unexpected phenomenon. 
From any simple teleological standpoint espousing ‘linear progress’ – the view that 
dominated nineteenth century liberalism just as much the early workers’ movement – 
empire was a great conundrum. It completely contradicted the idea that economic 
modernisation must bring political modernisation in its wake – most notably civil 
freedoms, national sovereignty, and constitutional democracy. Why, if capitalist 
progress had launched the world on a yellow brick road to liberty and emancipation, 
with only the ancien regimes and prejudices of a bygone age in the way, were the 
greatest industrial powers busily constructing a world polity from which all these 
values were absent for all but a tiny privileged minority? 
This is why, I think, the debate of that time is relevant today. The problem with 
approaching it objectively is if anything that it is still too near. Many of the ideas still 
current today are little more than fossilised remnants of the huge theoretical and 
doctrinal edifices which the people of the time used to understand their situation. 
The outcome was a radical three-sided debate, lasting from 1870 to the present day. 
The strongest initial contenders in this debate were the imperialists themselves, for 
whom empire was essential for the survival of European civilisation and, somewhat as 
an afterthought, the best way to introduce the ‘backward’ remainder of the world to its 
benefits. An awkward difficulty arose from an inability to decide which of several 
empires was best suited to these tasks, leading to two wars and the embarrassing if 
hopefully temporary substitution of Nazism for European civilisation.  
The intensely racist Weltanschauung which emerged was that the non-European 
peoples of the world, with the possible exception of at least some of our American 
cousins, were by their nature too barbaric for self-government. In its most developed 
form, this idea, which is now returning, was extended via the concept of ‘race’ to 
include populations in the metropolis itself.. This, we should note, extends the 
conception of backwardness far beyond the limits of nineteenth-century 
enlightenment values since it essentially sees the non-industrialised peoples as inferior 
humans, as biologically incapable of civilisation. This pre-existing backwardness 
meant that civilisation had to be imposed, rather than merely offered. It went further, 
however: it justified the brutal practices of empire (and eventually the genocidal 
targeting of  ethnic groups in the metropolis itself) on the grounds that the brutalised 
were not themselves fit for any other treatment, were not truly human.  Civilisation 
became, from this standpoint, the privilege of a biological elite rather than the 
universal right of all humans. 
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Besides creating the material conditions for a century of ‘wars and revolutions’ this 
provoked an intense intellectual reconsideration, tightly bound up with the principal 
successful political opponents of European imperialism. Twentieth century thought is 
dominated by two anti-imperialist views, each  seeking, successfully as it turned out, 
to finish off the 19th century empires. These were as radically opposed to each other 
as they were to their common enemy. For the Russian Bolsheviks, imperialism was 
the ‘highest stage’ of capitalism, an inevitable result of it, and essential to its survival. 
Bolshevism found its mirror image in Woodrow Wilson’s liberalism. American 
capital saw the European empires as an antiquated device to deprive non-Europeans 
of the economic benefits of capitalism. The true antidote to empire – not to mention 
Bolshevism – was therefore the most advanced form of capitalism, namely the 
American form, itself born of a colonial revolt.  
We can thus see that the basic issue was posed, in the long and conveniently forgotten 
discussion on empire, in the same manner as in the recent debates on development 
that we have just discussed – but with an important twist. For both sides, the 
European colonial system was a backward institution to be eliminated. But for the 
Wilsonians, the problem was the failure of the rest of the world (including Europe) to 
raise itself to American standards.3 For the Bolsheviks, the imperial system was a 
natural and barbaric creation of capitalism itself, and would hence inevitably re-
emerge in a different form until capitalism itself was abolished.4  
Empire thus not only created the immediately preceding material circumstances of the 
‘development’ debate – in the sense that it gave rise to the world order under 
discussion – but created its intellectual context. The question of empire dominated all 
early twentieth-century debates about policy in all nations and all spheres, to an extent 
which modern-day thinkers pay remarkably little attention, not only taking their 
theoretical heritage for granted but, as the Brenner-Wallerstein debate shows, 
assuming it has been handed down directly to them from the 19th and earlier centuries. 
Nevertheless imperialism places a fundamental question mark over Brenner’s most 
basic assertion, which is that with advent of specifically industrial capital, and the 
generalisation of ‘innovation as a means of accumulation’, capital no longer needed 
‘pre-capitalist’ or labour relations. The hallmark of colonial relations during the 
imperial epoch was the ever and ever more intense degradation of labour conditions. 
Empire consolidated a world division of labour in which the colonies specialised in 
cheap raw materials and foodstuffs, and the metropolis specialised in innovation. One 
has only to read the writings of Rhodes and Chamberlain or for that matter the King 
of Belgium to understand how directly and nakedly this was understood.  
Small wonder that the overwhelmingly predominant theoretical response, from 
Hobson to Hilferding to Lenin, was that industrial capital was not primarily 
responsible for it, that it was the outcome of an alien outgrowth, either financial 
capital as such, or some ghastly zombie takeover of industrial capital. Small wonder 
that late nineteenth century liberalism collapsed in on itself giving way to the aimless 
amorality of its Nietzsches, the philosophical cynicism of its Heideggers, the morbid 
historicism of its Spenglers and the mechanical anti-humanism of its Hayeks. 
Moreover, the great powers achieved this specialisation with the most barbaric labour 
practices known to the time. Imperialism was backward in two, linked senses. It was a 
backward political form, consciously structured around the political forms of 
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antiquity,1 and consolidated a backward economic division of labour. This gives rise 
to an obvious question. If European industrial capital had no need of technically 
backward production methods or formally backward class relations, why did it impose 
them on four-fifths of the world? 
Three debates and one question 
Three apparently distinct debates – on 18th century transition 19th century empire, and 
20th century development – address the same underlying question: Is backwardness an 
outcome of modernity or is it the rest of the world dragging its feet?5 This recurrence, 
despite enormous changes, is compelling. It suggests a hypothesis: that there is a 
general law of capitalist development covering all these periods, which causes this 
question to recur. 
Some caveats are required. Though the same question does recur, each time it takes a 
new form. Is the similarity a mere resemblance, phenomenon with no underlying 
noumenon? Is this resemblance vacuous – without empirical content? Is it superficial 
– without theoretical substance? 
Although the discussions are abstractly similar, the concrete issues at each point in 
history are distinct. The twenty-first century world market is not that of 1914. Marx’s 
radicalism was his understanding that the economic reality of 1848 could not be 
addressed using the political theories of 1789. In turn, underlying Bolshevik 
radicalism was their understanding that the economic reality of 1917 could not be 
addressed with the political theories of 1848.  
The economic reality which emerged from 1945 was again different, and in many 
senses the postwar development debate may be seen as an attempt to escape an 
analytical framework of ‘stages of history’ which served the Bolsheviks adequately 
but no longer explained the social formations of a world made up of nations already 
organised by capitalism, employing ever more backward techniques of capitalist 
production combined with the social weight of huge landed classes comprising, 
essentially, either small producers or rural proletarians.  
All attempts mechanically to apply a historically outdated doctrine give rise to a 
positively reactionary programme: Proudhonism in 1848, social democracy in 1914, 
and not a few Lost Bolshevik Tribes after World War II. It would be equally 
dangerous, to solve the problems of 2007 with the policies of 1917. Historical 
specificity is, however, no excuse for a failure to learn from the past. The problem is 
to determine whether, behind the superficial resemblance of the questions posed, there 
lies an underlying reality of capitalism as a whole, over the whole of its history, which 
forces the question to recur at all its critical junctures. The first task of this enquiry is 
to look at the evidence. 
The backwardness of modernity 
The separation of the study of economics from the rest of the social sciences has 
produced the odd result that economists no longer feel themselves called upon to 
account for history. This is I think wrong: I don’t see how any body of knowledge 
which claims to seek objective truth can accept as valid a theory which wrongly 
                                                 
1
 Late Victorian coins even carried a legend, surrounding the queen’s portrait, proclaiming her empress 
of India in Latin. 
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predicts a fact, whether or not that fact ‘belongs’ to the narrow set of issues that the 
theory is supposed to address. If a theory gives rise to a prediction then it must stand 
judged by it, whether or not its practitioners choose to apply it for this purpose. 
Economic theories give rise to predictions about history, and should be judged by 
them. Neoliberal theory clearly predicts that the opening of the global south to world 
markets – notably capital markets –  should have led to a rise in the rate of growth of 
world output, and a reduction in world inequality. 
Brenner is less definitive, but his argument strongly suggests that the principal 
obstacle to the dominant trend of innovation-driven capital accumulation – an 
unambiguous, if uneven, development of all the productive resources of the planet – is 
the existence of pre-capitalist or non-capitalist labour relations. 
The last twenty-five years, constitute, I think, a test of both theses. 
The period 1982 witnessed the greatest triumph of the market and capitalist 
organisation of production generally which has been seen in history. Capitalist 
relations of production cover the globe. The world market – including the world 
market in capital – is more developed than at any time ever. In the process, ‘pre-
capitalist’ production relations, most notably those based on Brenner’s and 
Wallerstein’s ‘forced labour’ have become a marginal and inconsequential feature in 
capitalist development.  
Thirty years on from the ‘Dependency’ debate, it is almost impossible to find any part 
of the globe (outside of countries in which significant post-capitalist formations 
persist or are being constructed) which is not organised by capital and in which the 
capitalist mode of production does not prevail. Production, outside of state and a 
variety of cooperative institutions, is either organised by bringing together means of 
production owned by private capitalists, and labour power which is sold on the 
market, or by small owners (including a very large number of peasant landowners) 
who work with their own property and sell their produce on the market. It is 
reasonably fair to say that the world of today is the most wholly capitalist that it has 
every been.  
The outcome of the last 20-25 years therefore provide a significant empirical test of 
both the Neoliberal thesis and the various views expressed in the Brenner-Wallerstein 
debate. 
In the last twenty-five years also, data on the world economy has improved 
immeasurably, making it possible to construct reasonably robust measures of the 
relative and absolute performance of the world economy over the past 40-50 years 
based on data from virtually all countries. 
With the release of two databases in September 2006 –  the IMF’s September 2006 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) – data now exists covering 75 per cent of the world’s population for 
as far back as 1960. The two datasets together offer a long-run overview of the world 
economy for nearly half a century.  
I have produced a detailed analysis of WEO data, going back to 1970, for which the 
reader is referred to Freeman and Kagarlitsky (2004). Further more recent material is 
available on request. The additional data provided here takes the analysis back to 
1960 and updates it to the most recent information available at the time of writing. 
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Using this categories of the IMF itself permits a simple division of the world into two 
categories: those that the IMF labels ‘advanced’ and those that it does not. The basic 
facts are as follows. 
First, the division of the world into these two great ‘camps’ is remarkably persistent. 
The Bolshevik classification of the world into the small group of ‘robber baron’ 
countries and the entire remainder, is virtually untouched today. Since the early 
twentieth century, and probably since the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
economy of the world has kept its countries divided into two great groups. The first 
group comprises what is now termed the Euro Area, North America, and Japan. It has 
been joined, since the second World War, by about 80 million people living in South 
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan. (Together with Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand, this latter comprise a group which this report calls ‘Advanced South-East 
Asia’). These constitute the only truly ‘peripheral’ additions to the territories of the 
advanced countries. 
This group is in the process of being joined, probably definitively outside of some 
unprecedented systemic crisis, by an enlarged population of the Euro Area, adding 
from Wallerstein’s ‘semi-periphery’ another 100 million people. The improvement 
can be considered slightly larger if one chooses to consider countries such as Greece 
or Portugal to have previously been semi-peripheral, a judgement which is moot at 
least in the case of Portugal since until the 1970s it was the only remaining European 
country still possessing a significant empire. 
The combined population of the advanced countries, so defined, was 1,070 million in 
2005 and 760 million in 1960. The population of the countries that have actually 
joined this group from the periphery therefore constitute less than ten per cent of it 
and from the semi-periphery, 10 per cent. This should be  compared with a natural 
growth of 20 per cent. These same additions to the advanced territories constitute 
precisely 3.4 per cent of the population of the non-advanced countries. In sum, the 
total population of the territories that have ‘developed’ were, in 2005, less than 3 per 
cent of the people of the world. 
This is a huge historical constant of late modernity, the elephant in the dining room of 
development analysis. To put it as bluntly as possible, since the consolidation of the 
European system, the victory of the North in the Civil War, and the emergence of 
Japan as a proto-industrial power, development has not happened. Almost no 
demographically significant part of the ‘developing’ world joined the developed 
world.  
This fact is systematically ignored – one hesitates to say ‘concealed’ – by its division, 
in contemporary research, into a hundred small pieces, raising up one ‘great white 
hope’ after another as evidence of an impending breakthrough. Essentially what this 
involves is the construction of arbitrary boundaries – looking at one particular 
country, or comparing one small group of countries, or ignoring boundaries 
altogether, instead of starting from the actual, very stable, general territorial structure 
which modernity has created. This is the economic equivalent of declaring a dying 
man free of the plague on the grounds that his left foot is free of buboes. 
The next question to consider is whether, despite this persistence of two parallel 
worlds – imperial and colonial, ‘advanced’ and ‘developing’, first and third, or North 
and South – the names change but the division remains – there has been an economic 
closing of the gap, a coming together of the two worlds. 
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The evidence against this hypothesis is compelling. First of all there is a considerable 
body of cliometric research pushing back the boundaries of accurate measurement of 
disparity well into the mid-nineteenth century, and concerned with what is known as 
the ‘great divide’ (cf Pritchett, Maddison, etc) 
Has this got worse, or better, in the thirty years since the debate in question? Chart  1 
exhibits an indicator which I call the world inequality index. This is the GDP per 
capita of the advanced countries (as defined above) divided by the GDP per capita of 
the rest of the world. During the period of globalisation6 this took a step jump 
upwards. In 1982 the ratio was 12:1, and over two pre-globalisation decades hovered, 
as the trend line shows, around 14:1. By 1988 it had risen to 20:1 and by the end of 
globalisation reached a long-term average of 19:1. Depending on the start and end 
dates of the comparison, world inequality has risen by at least 50% and possibly by as 
much as 100%. 
Chart 1: world Inequality index 
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Source: IMF and World Bank 
By way of comparison, Maddison has calculated that in 1900, the GDP per capita of 
the richest nation and the poorest, was in the ratio of 7:1. That is, average global 
inequality in modern times was already twice as great as the maximum inequality of 
imperial times. A fair comparison with this 1900 figure is provided by the ratio 
between the GDP per capita of India and that of the USA, which in the year 2004 had 
reached 60:1. 
There is also very strong evidence that this relative divergence, because it is took 
place in a context of generally low world growth and stagnation, brought with it a 
considerable extension of absolute pauperisation. The figures in tables 1, 2 and 4 are 
supplied by CEPAL, the United Nations research agency dealing with Latin America. 
‘Pobreza’ is defined as being unable to purchase a basic basket of goods. ‘Indigencia’ 
is defined as being unable to purchase a meal every day. 
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Table 1: poverty and indigence in Latin America under globalisation 
 Latin America  Venezuela 
 1980 2000 2002 2003  1981 1994 1999 
Whole population         
 Poverty %  40.5 42.5 44 44.3  19.5 47.1 53 
 Indigence %  18.6 18.1 19.4 19.2  5.5 17.1 n/a 
Urban population         
 Poverty %  29.8 35.9 38.4 38.9  25 48.7 49.4 
 Indigence %  10.6 11.7 13.5 13.7  8.8 19.2 21.7 
Table 2: Unemployment in Latin America under globalisation 
País 1980 1990 2000 2004 
Argentina 2.6 7.4 15.1 13.6 
Barbados ... 14.7 9.2 9.8 
Bolivia ... 7.3 7.5 8.5 
Brasil 6.3 4.3 7.1 11.5 
Chile 11.7 9.2 9.2 8.8 
Colombia 10 10.5 17.2 15.4 
Costa Rica 6 5.4 5.3 6.7 
Cuba ... ... 5.5 1.9 
Ecuador 5.7 6.1 14.1 11 
El Salvador ... 10 6.5 6.5 
Guatemala 2.2 6.3 ... 4 
Honduras 8.8 7.8 ... 8 
Jamaica ... 15.3 15.5 11.7 
México 4.5 2.7 3.4 5.3 
Nicaragua 5 7.6 9.8 9.3 
Panamá 9.9 20 15.2 14.1 
Paraguay 4.1 6.6 10 10 
Perú 7.1 8.3 8.5 9.4 
República Dominicana ... ... 13.9 18.4 
Trinidad y Tabago ... 20.1 12.2 8.6 
Uruguay 7.4 8.5 13.6 13.1 
Venezuela (República Bolivariana de) 6 10.4 13.9 15.3 
América Latina y el Caribe 6.2 5.8 10.4 10.3 
 
The calculation of unemployment in Latin America almost certainly significantly 
underestimates its extent because it tends to exclude mendicants and persons in very 
precarious and marginal occupations. Indigence is often a better guide to economic 
marginalisation. These figures point to something beyond mere poverty: they signal 
the exclusion from involvement not just in consumption, but production, of 
somewhere between a fifth and a half of the population 
It is exceptionally hard to reconcile these very persistent longue durée trends, and 
most of all their acceleration under the greatest extension of the capitalist world order 
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in history, with any idea other than that there is an exceptionally powerful force, 
coming from within capitalism itself, which does indeed ‘develop underdevelopment’ 
– which manufactures backwardness out of modernity. 
The modernity of backwardness 
On the basis of this strong evidence that backwardness is alive, kicking and growing 
in very recent times, it would seem advisable to revisit the evidence as it relates to the 
original discussion about the transition to capitalism 
Brenner, in his choice of evidence, is at great pains to establish the independence of 
industrial capitalism from Eastern European re-feudalisation and in this, makes a 
strong and knowledgeable case. However neither Wallerstein, nor any informed 
commentator on the basis for West European industrialisation, advances the strong 
thesis that it was primarily an outcome of developments in Eastern Europe, so the 
case that ‘development produces underdevelopment’, that there is a mutual relation 
between industrialisation in the metropolis  and the barbarisation of the periphery, is 
not proven or disproven in this way. 
Rather, the decisive causal issue concerns relations in the periphery itself, in the 
colonies and (in the particular debate under consideration here) in the Americas. 
What should count as decisive evidence? Within the Americas themselves matters are 
complicated by the ‘early’ construction of many Latin American institutions. South of 
the Rio Grande, most of America was colonised by the ‘mercantile but pre-industrial’ 
powers Spain and Portugal. This makes the construction of empirical tests more 
difficult. On the one hand some apparently genuine’ pre-capitalist labour relations 
were without doubt transplanted from the Old World – in particular quasi-dynastic 
systems of landownership – and more importantly, a direct relation did not exist 
between the capitalist development of the Holland and England, and the colonial 
empires of Spain and Portugal. Rather the relation was an indirect one, the influx of 
wealth from the Americas furnishing purchasing power for the Iberian aristocracies 
(including their fratricidal and ultimately self-destructive wars) which provided the 
crucial impetus for the Lowlands to become, for two centuries, the workshop and 
epicentre of European capitalist development. 
However a striking aspect of the discussion is that, perhaps as a result of Brenner’s 
chosen specialisation, he dedicates little space to slavery, surely a relevant issue if 
considering the relation between capitalist and pre-capitalist institutions in early or 
indeed later modern times.  In the case of slavery the above complications do not 
exist. The industrial revolution and the slave trade are directly connected and, 
therefore, this connection provides a much stronger empirical test of the actual 
relation between industrialisation and backwardness. We have the direct and 
simultaneous appearance of the most advanced industrial techniques in the world, and 
the most barbaric labour practice history had yet produced, side by side and in an 
intimate relationship. 
Marx’s own view was clear and succinctly put: 
Whilst the cotton industry introduced child-slavery in England, it gave in the United 
States a stimulus to the transformation of the earlier, more or less patriarchal slavery, 
into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage-workers 
in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world. (Capital 
Volume I ch 31) 
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The facts support this view. Tables 3-5 below relate to the growth of the cotton 
industry in England and the USA7 
Table 3: The British and US cotton trade between 1701 and 1800. 
 Year  
UK 
Exports 
£000 
(source 
1) 
UK 
Imports 
‘000 lbs. 
(source 1) 
 Date 
UK 
Exports 
£000 per 
year 
(source 2) 
% total 
UK 
exports 
Date 
US cotton 
production 
bales 
(source 3) 
1741 21 1,645      
1751 46 2,976      
1764 200 3,870      
1780 355 6,766 1784-86 255 6.0   
1790 1,662 31,447 1794-96 1,131 15.6 1790 3,135 
1800 5,406 56,011 1804-06 5,290 42.3 1800 73,145 
   1814-16 6,247 42.1 1815 208,986 
   1824-26 5,626 47.8 1825 532,915 
   1834-36 7,466 48.5 1835 1,060,711 
   1844-46 8,612 44.2 1845 1,804,223 
   1854-56 11,636 34.1 1855 3,217,417 
 
Table 4: Employment in the Lancashire 
cotton industry, 1801 to 1861. 
Date 
number of 
workers in 
industry 
% of 
working 
population 
1801 242,000 35.9 
1811 306,000 36.9 
1821 369,000 35.0 
1831 427,000 31.9 
1841 374,000 22.4 
1851 379,000 18.6 
1861 446,000 18.3 
 
Table 5: composition of the population of the USA 
 
Census 
Year Slaves 
Total US 
population 
1790 697,681 3,929,214 
1800 893,602 5,308,483 
1810 1,191,362 7,239,881 
1820 1,538,022 9,638,453 
1830 2,009,043 12,860,702 
1840 2,487,355 17,063,353 
1850 3,204,313 23,191,876 
1860 3,953,760 31,443,321 
 
Most US analyses focus for understandable reasons on the relation between the 
institution of slavery and the politics and economics of the USA. Conversely, analyses 
of the industrial revolution focus on its role in Europe. In consequence, the relation 
between the two processes has got less attention than it deserves. There is great 
sensitivity in the US to the idea that slavery was economically profitable, arising from 
the legitimate fear that this could lead to condoning and apologising for the 
institution.8 But there is a reverse side to this coin. This is not whether slave 
production was profitable for Americans but whether it was profitable for the British 
in the heyday of the revolution in British productivity. The equal and opposite danger 
to condoning the ‘particular institution’ is to condone and indeed, conveniently on the 
anniversary of abolition, underplay and conceal British complicity in it. 
Brenner’s argument is that, once capital has can increase its profits by innovating, it 
no longer needs other means of doing so. In the debate on transition, the argument is 
that forced labour is economically defunct in the age of industrial revolutions. To 
judge this question empirically, it is essential to study the real extent of 
interdependence between British industrialisation, and North American slavery. 
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The issue is to get a grip on the scale of the process and the relative role of the two 
forms of labour comprising it. One has to begin from an understanding that the 
plantation economy of the South, and the industrial economy of Lancashire, formed in 
effect a single integrated economic system whose input was plantation cotton and 
whose output was manufactured cloth. 
Thus by 1840, 60 per cent of the world’s cotton cloth was made in Lancashire and by 
1860, cotton exports from the USA accounted for two-thirds of world supply. As 
early as 1780, 72 per cent of the exports of the Lower South and 82 per cent of the 
outputs of the Upper South were to Britain. 
We can make a crude estimate of the structure of its labour force, that is, the direct 
labour inputs involved in producing cotton cloth starting with the plantation and 
ending with the cloth, using tables 4 and 5. As a first estimate, we suppose that the 
great majority of slave labour was engaged in the production of cotton. This is 
certainly excessive, but two figures suggest it is not markedly so. This is the estimate 
of productivity provided by the US department of agriculture, which states that in 
1820, the average number of bales per slave per year was 0.2 and in 1860, 1.9 This 
figure which must have been rounded down since it appears to be an overestimate: 
applying it to the last column in table 3 yields a direct labour input, to the production 
of US cotton, of 1,700,000 which is greater than the recorded number of slaves in the 
USA at the time (1,538,000) according to table 5. It yields a direct slave labour input 
of  3,953,000 which matches the slave population recorded by the Bureau of the 
Census (3,837,000). This suggests that it is not qualitatively misleading to take the 
slave population of the USA as a proxy, at least in those two years, for the direct slave 
labour input into the cotton producing process. 
Let us suppose that, in accordance with the proportion of US cotton exports consumed 
by Lancashire in 1840, 60 per cent of this direct labour was involved in the production 
of the final exported product of Lancashire industry. This yields table 6 
Table 6: labour composition of the cotton goods produced by Britain 
Year Number of 
slaves 
in the USA 
Direct slave 
labour  inputs 
Number of 
cotton 
workers in 
Lancashire 
Total labour 
force 
of the global 
cotton industry 
Proportion of slave 
direct  
labour in the global 
cotton industry 
1820 1,538,000 923,000 369,000 1,292,000 71% 
1860 3,953,000 2,372,000 446,000 2,818,000 84% 
From this very approximate estimate it appears that: 
(1) certainly more than  two thirds, and perhaps as much as four fifths of the 
labour inputs to the British cotton industry, during the heyday of its industrial 
supremacy, was slave labour.  
(2) This proportion appears if anything to have increased during the process of 
industrialisation. 
If the plantation economy had been located in, say, Yorkshire, it would be impossible 
to sustain the argument that ‘capitalist’ (in Brenner’s sense) and ‘pre-capitalist 
relations excluded each other. Even the cotton barons of  nineteenth century 
Lancashire would have found it intellectually challenging to explain away the 
presence of three million slaves on their doorstep; it is hard to avoid suspecting that 
the literature on European industrialisation would have been somewhat different. But 
economically this is just how the system functioned, and hence also, historically. The 
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only difference is geography, viz, the Atlantic. Because of the colonial and post-
colonial geographical organisation of the world economy, the underlying global 
reality escapes notice, and is indeed denied. Far from ‘displacing’, or leading to the 
economic withering away of ‘pre-capitalist’ or backward labour inputs, the cotton 
industry was completely bound up with it and moreover, over nearly a hundred years 
of ‘accumulation by innovation’, the proportional role of slavery, in terms of quantity 
of labour, was the completely dominant form of labour organisation. 
It might be thought that this is of only secondary account because industrialisation 
was in some sense ‘not about cloth’ but concerned with coal, engines, steam, 
machinery, and the like. But textiles in general, and cotton in particular were the 
driver of the two successive industrial revolutions which established British 
supremacy in Europe, converting it into the ‘workshop of the world’. The simple 
sequence of inventions tells the story. The conventional ‘starting point’ of the 
Industrial revolution itself is John Kay’s flying shuttle in 1733, followed by Thomas 
Higham and James Hargreaves Spinning Jenny in the 1760s, leading to Richard 
Arkwright’s more advanced water frame and the first – cotton –  ‘manufactury’ in the 
Pennines in 1773, followed ten years later by Cartwright’s power loom. 
By 1802 the industry accounted for between 4 and 5 per cent of the national income 
of Britain. By 1812 there were 100,000 spinners and 250,000 weavers working in the 
industry. Production had grown to 8 percent and had now overtaken the woollen 
industry. By 1830 more than half the value of British home-produced exports 
consisted of cotton textiles. 
The centrality of cotton extended well beyond the first industrial revolution which 
centred, essentially, on the mechanisation of the production process of cloth: it drove 
the twin revolutions in motive power (coal and steam) and transport (railways) that 
determined the nature of the second industrial revolution. One can easily grasp this by 
beginning from what everyone ‘knows’ about the second industrial revolution, simply 
asking ‘what was it used for’? Within ten years of Boulton and Watt’s steam engine, it 
was in use as a motive power for Cartwright’s loom, probably its first commercial use 
outside a colliery. By 1850 there were 250,000 power-looms in Britain. The first 
commercial railway linked Manchester and the Atlantic port of Liverpool, organising 
centre of the triangle trade. Manchester, of Engels fame, was the pulsating heart of the 
second industrial revolution, organised for over sixty years (as table 4 shows) around 
the expansion of the cotton industry giving it the nickname ‘cottonopolis’. Manchester 
was the organising centre of pro-Southern sentiment in the Civil War– in 1861, 55 
years after the formal abolition of slavery in the British empire.10 
It also seems to me that some caution is required before accepting that the plantation 
economy itself excluded innovation. As noted, productivity measured in cotton bales 
per person is recorded as having risen by 400 per cent in 20 years. The ‘second wave’ 
of plantation expansion was provoked by a machine – the Cotton Gin, permitting the 
mass production of long-staple cotton that grew in the conditions of the Lower South. 
Contemporary accounts state that using the Gin, a man could clean fifty times as 
much cotton as before. The transformation was one of both quality and quantity, and 
in fact provoked, from the early to mid 19th Century onwards, a further shift away 
from Indian cotton with its less efficient production techniques.  
Though I am aware the issue is very controversial, it does not at all seem to offer 
decisive evidence that forced labour, as contended by Brenner, is intrinsically 
incompatible with relative surplus value. There is some evidence – see table 7 – that 
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capitalism in the South did make a more marked turn to innovation when the civil war 
had removed or reduced the options. This suggests a direction of causation rather 
opposite to that suggested by Brenner, namely, it is not the case that innovation turns 
capital away from forced or otherwise ‘precapitalist’ techniques, so much as that 
when political or other constraints deny access to these labour methods, the capitalists 
turn to innovation in reaction. 
Table 7: Cotton Gin Patents in the Southern States, 1831-1890 
Years Number of Patents 
1831-40 5 
1841-50 7 
1851-60 53 
1861-70 21 
1871-80 109 
1881-90 156 
Left to their own devices, the purely economic mechanisms of industrial capitalism do 
not appear to have led to any significant diminution in the use of the ‘pre-capitalist’ 
relation of slavery, but to the contrary to its extension in direct proportion to the 
demand emanating from the industrial revolution. Conversely, the competitive 
advantage which established British supremacy on world markets lasting over a 
century, was founded on an export product produced by labour of which at least 
eighty percent was the labour of slaves. 
This was the source of Henry Hammond’s famous 1858 boast: 
Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us, we could 
bring the whole world to our feet... What would happen if no cotton was furnished for 
three years?... England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with 
her save the South. No, you dare not to make war on cotton. No power on the earth dares 
to make war upon it. Cotton is King. 
The real question is then why Hammond turned out to be wrong: this is the first 
indication of what I think is a further decisive missing element of Brenner’s critique, 
and to a lesser extent Wallerstein’s own construction – the role of the state in 
transition. Slavery was not ended by economic forces. Left to their own devices these 
led to a fifty-year expansion of slave-based cotton production. The downfall of the 
slave system was the outcome of a political intervention of the most ‘advanced’ form 
yet known: the first modern industrialised war. 
True, this was the expression of an economic fact: Northern superiority. The point is 
through which institution was this superiority demonstrated and imposed? Not 
through the market but – just as capitalism proper gained its first real foothold in 
Europe through three successive revolutions – through the (violent) construction of a 
particular type of state which carried out the economic transformation, including the 
expropriation of a large part of the capital of the South, which until Abolition took the 
form of the ownership of slaves. 
The laws of capitalist development 
Faced with a contradiction between theory and evidence, the first responsible step is 
to look once again at the theory, and try and see what might have been missed. 
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In the long citation from Brenner already given, we find the two principal and linked 
arguments in support of his main idea that development, and underdevelopment, have 
no necessary connection. These are: 
(1) that the advent of modern industry and in particular, the arrival of relative 
surplus value, capitalism acquires the option of dispensing with forced labour, 
and all methods which increase extraction of surplus other than by innovating 
(2) that, in consequence, the outcome of development in any particular geographic 
location is merely contingent, depending on no underlying economic law of 
development but only on the class relations which happen to be established. In 
particular it depends on whether free labour – a proletariat which owns its own 
labour power and sells it as a commodity – emerges. 
Brenner does not argue that the advent of industrial capital, and innovation as a law of 
development, compels all earlier social forms to extinction. His argument, it appears 
to me, is that the existence of such social forms is contingent. Given the development 
of the USA this is clearly true, but the question is ‘contingent on what?’ His point of 
departure is what he considers an erroneous judgement in the Communist Manifesto: 
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of 
production and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of 
society. Conservation of the old modes of production in an altered form was, on the 
contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant 
revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty, and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. 
The bourgeoisie . . . draw all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization. The cheap 
prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls 
. . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; 
it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, to become bourgeois 
themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image.’ Brenner (1974:25-26) citing 
Marx (The Communist Manifesto) 
This, he says, does not appear to have happened:  
Many writers have quite properly pointed out that historical developments since the mid-
nineteenth century have tended to belie this ‘optimistic’, ‘progressist’ prognosis, in that 
the capitalist penetration of the ‘third world’ through trade and capital investment not 
only has failed to carry with it capitalist economic development, but has erected positive 
barriers to such development. (Brenner 1974:26) 
Before examining the premises of this dismissal, one must first ask if it is true. In 
what sense is this passage ‘optimistic’, and in what sense has capitalist penetration of 
the world failed to carry with it a capitalist economic development? Once again, the 
central question is what is to be understood by development, and more precisely, what 
is to be understood by capitalism. 
If one reads the Manifesto as saying that by the year 2000, the world will look like 
London or New York in 2000, then it does indeed seem wide of the mark. If however 
one reads it as forecasting that by 2000 most of the world will look like Manchester in 
1848, then it must count as quite close to the mark. 
To find an error in the Manifesto’s formulation of the laws of capitalist development 
one must suppose – in a manifesto proclaiming the necessity of Communism – not so 
much a rosy vision of the future but a rosy vision of the present. One must read into it 
a laudatory and apologetic conception of the society in which the manfesto was 
written, of the ‘image’ the world is to be compelled to adopt.  
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The bourgeois society confronted by the Communists of 1848 included child slavery, 
a condition of women which the Manifesto describes as slavery and the universal 
prostitition of the bourgeoisie, a working week generally over 70 hours, the living 
conditions of the Manchester slums, a real wage rarely rising above subsistence, and a 
life expectancy little over 50.  
The writers to which Brenner refers – and presumably Brenner himself – have read 
this passage in the manner of Whig Historians, for whom the standard of comparison 
is modernity, that is, the most advanced material and moral conditions to be found in 
the world today. They read it in a particular, Wilsonian, manner, which understands 
the ‘bourgeois mode of production’ as a social formation free of any contradiction 
other than between worker and owner, a universally advanced state of the whole of 
humankind in which only the most advanced techniques, working conditions, and 
living conditions are to be found. Of course, this has not happened. But we should ask 
whether this is because the Communist Manifesto is wrong, or because Wilsonian 
Liberalism is wrong. 
The passage is only ‘optimistic’ and ‘progressist’ if one supposes the Communists 
identified capitalism with progress and progress with capitalism, that is, if one 
presupposes that the writers believed nothing except good could come of capitalism in 
itself, and any weaknesses were the outcome of alien intrusions. In addition, it must 
be added, one must presuppose that all capitalist production is ‘advanced’ production 
in Brenner’s sense, that it competes with other capitals by technically innovating, a 
point to which we will return. 
The real issue concerning the accuracy of the Manifesto is a different one. The point 
of the passage above was to forecast the emergence of a revolutionary class, a 
worldwide class which would unite worldwide to overthrow emergent capitalism. It is 
this particular forecast that has run into more difficulties than expected at the time.  
The passage is concerned not with the rise of capitalism but its downfall: it seeks to 
explain that by generalising itself throughout the world, it would dig its own grave. 
Obvious misunderstanding will arise if it is supposed the Communists entertained the 
notion it would do this by making the world into a rose garden. 
This now brings us to the central issue, that of the classes which arise as a result of the 
capitalist penetration of the world. What really puzzled the participants in the 
dependency debate, befuddled as were two whole generations of historians by the 
notion that in each country, history would run through the successive stages of pre-
feudal, feudal, and capitalist social formations, is that they found in countries 
apparently penetrated by capital, class relations which appeared not to be capitalist 
and which, therefore, they classified in their minds as ‘precapitalist’. Encountering 
slavery, they saw in it the slave relations of antiquity. Encountering peonage, they saw 
in it the servitude of early mediaeval times. Encountering latifundistas, they saw 
manorial barons. 
This, I think, entirely misses the point. These classes were introduced by capitalism. 
Nothing illustrates this more clearly than slavery, which was almost non-existent in 
North America until its precipitate rise as a direct consequence, and essential element, 
of the industrial and second industrial revolutions. Above all it must never be 
forgotten that a slave is a commodity, directly exchanged for money. Slaves in the 
antebellum South were capital, bought and sold like cattle. It is only if one sees and 
conceives of capitalism as naturally tending towards perfection by its own standards, 
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viewing it in short through Wilsonian spectacles, that one can easily fail to see that 
antebellum Slavery was not a pre-capitalist but a capitalist institution. 
This leads me to the main theoretical points of this paper. 
Precapitalist capitalism? 
First, are these allegedly pre-capitalist forms really precapitalist at all? Or are they in 
fact either specifically capitalist institutions or capitalist adaptations of pre-capitalist 
institutions? No-one claims that because servile labour is the basis of feudalism, that 
under feudalism waged labour cannot exist. Why then suppose that simply because 
wage-labour is the essential foundation of capitalism, it is the only new labouring 
activity compatible with it?  
Capitalism has given birth to many and varied propertied classes beside the cartoon 
top-hatted mill-owner, from Whig magnates and Wall Street rentiers to mafia barons, 
impresarios and football club owners. Why should it not also create new labouring 
classes? Why not recognise its interns, apprentices, and mechanised housewives, 
along with its colonial indentured servants, share-croppers, peasants and slaves as 
merely some of the generally varied, frequently oppressive and invariably modern 
labour forms which make up the capitalist mode of production in its totality? Whether 
these belong to a past or a present era seems to be completely secondary to the real 
question of what they actually do, how they actually function. 
The driver of profits: labour relations or capital techniques? 
This leads to the next point: Brenner also makes a rather peculiar distinction, perhaps 
merely engaging with Wallerstein’s own terminology: he distinguishes ‘forced 
labour’ from ‘free’ wage labour as if force did not enter the life of the wage-earner. In 
Marx, the concept of ‘free’ labour signifies labour without personal dependency, in a 
relation with the employer which is severed when the worker leaves the factory. 
However in the factory the manager is every bit as despotic as the baron on the manor 
and calls on all manner of violence to maintain this despotism. ‘Force’ as a category 
of labour relations does not distinguish prior epochs from capitalism. 
Which leads to a third point: Marx himself disagrees with Brenner on the relation 
between absolute and relative surplus value, and this is not merely a doctrinal but a 
real and relevant question. In Volume I of Capital one finds, first the section entitled 
‘Absolute Surplus Value’, then the section entitled ‘Relative Surplus Value’ and 
finally a third section entitled ‘Relative and Absolute Surplus Value’. Both here and 
on the section on machinery in Theories of Relative Surplus Value, Marx is at pains to 
stress that with the arrival of machine production, one sees the historically greatest 
extension of the working day ever. It was industry that worked children to death in 
coal mines and created the conditions of Dickens’ Britain, not agriculture. It was 
industry that introduced three-shift working, the production line, and the ten-hour day. 
In fact, prefiguring again the question of the state, the forces that reduced this 
oppression were not economic but political: the Factory Acts, and two centuries of 
class struggle and legislation. 
The reason is, as Marx points out, is that once the era of permanent innovation begins, 
the clock starts ticking for the capital investment. As soon as the capitalist out-
innovates her rivals, someone else, somewhere else, out-innovates her in turn. The 
machine depreciates morally; its value is reduced all the time even if no use is made 
of it, because machines of the same type or with the same function are being produced 
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elsewhere for less and less, and her competitive advantage is inexorably innovated 
away. Every capitalist is in a race to realise the value of the invested capital before it 
is innovated out of existence by the next in line. With the arrival of machinofacture 
begins the drive to keep the machine idle for as little as possible, and with it the 
corresponding drive to lengthen the working day. 
In conclusion it is a mistake to conceive of absolute surplus value as ‘competing’ with 
relative surplus value, or of one form of labour organisation ‘competing’ with another. 
Competition is in the age of innovation is always competition between techniques, 
whether this is Lancashire cotton mills versus village handicrafts, pocket calculators 
versus abacuses, or GM pharmaceuticals versus subsistence horticulture. 
To summarise, the decisive distinction in the capitalist era between the economically 
backward and the economically advanced is no longer the form of the labour relation 
and certainly not the degree of despotism, but the level of technique. There is no 
particular reason to suppose that, for a given type of machinery, the capitalists will 
prefer any particular form of labour relation, given only that they can find on the 
market, or retain under their control, the labour force that will work on that type of 
machine. 
Cheaper wages – who gains? 
It is not deniable that wage labour, in long-term competition with other property 
relations involving labour, does eventually predominate. What the facts call into 
dispute is whether this is an automatic economic process requiring no political 
intervention, and the time-scale of the process – to both of which we will return. In 
what in fact does reside the economic superiority, for capitalism, of waged labour 
over all other forms? 
The main reason is well known: it is that the factory owner does not need to feed his 
workers. He needs only buy them, and they have to feed themselves. The difficulty 
facing the property owner in all labour relations with a persistent personal bond, 
whether of loyalty as in family retainers, or dehumanising ownership as in slavery, is 
that the property owner has to feed the worker. That which Marx calls the ‘marvellous 
peculiarity’ of the wage relation is the reserve army of labour, which on the one hand 
holds wage demands in check, and on the other provides the capitalists with an 
seemly inexhaustible fund of further labourers. 
But what determines the level of the wage? On this it seems to me that Brenner is not 
so much in error as off beam. He writes almost as if the innovating capitalist was 
entitled thereby to pay his workers less wages. In point of fact, the course of history is 
generally the opposite – as Henry Ford’s well-known invention clearly shows. 
In discussing any evolutionary process involving capital, it is always necessary 
carefully to distinguish between the eventual social outcome of any change, with its 
own specific rationality, and the individual outcome for the capitalist. The typical 
dynamic of competitive capitalism is that one particular individual, enterprise, or even 
class fraction will benefit from some change, so that it is individually rational, but the 
eventual social effect is counterproductive either for capital as a whole or for society 
as a whole. 
Why does ‘relative surplus value’ open a new age for capital? Fundamentally because 
it permits the capitalist class as a whole, without expanding the labour force, to 
increase its profits by cheapening the labour required to reproduce that labour force. 
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Nonetheless, this is a social or indirect benefit to capital. The inventor of a better 
mousetrap does not, the next day, obtain privileged access to cheaper cheese. The 
reduction of wages arises from a relatively complex process involving several stages 
of indirection taking a great deal of time – for example via petrol engines to tractors to 
harvesters to corn, bread, and sandwiches. Moreover it is offset by the class struggle. 
Empirically, in the metropolitan countries, the rate of exploitation – the share of total 
labour appropriated by capital – is surprisingly constant, which is what lies behind the 
general tendency of real wages to ‘chase’ prices. 
Cheaper foodstuffs, and cheaper means of subsistence – most of which are world 
market goods except for highly perishable goods or goods like restaurant meals at the 
last stage of the chain – create the potential a lower wage for all capitalists, not just 
for the innovating capitalist. It is mistaken, therefore, to infer that a country in which 
the capitalists innovate reaps the benefits of a lower wage in the form of some kind of 
competitive advantage, as if the high-tech country could pay lower wages. What 
actually happens is quite the reverse: it is in the low-tech countries that the wage falls, 
so that what actually arises is the precise division of social organisation which 
Emmanuel and other theorists of unequal exchange accurately describe. 
But what is the outcome of cheaper wages or, more generally, cheaper subsistence 
goods? It is precisely that techniques of production can survive, by paying much 
lower wages, which would otherwise be competed out of existence. Alongside a range 
of techniques, there emerges a range of wages. 
The geographical separation of the workforce, and above its political separation by 
the establishment of a system of nation states, greatly intensifies this. In a single 
country, the ‘moral and historical’ element of the wage is established not just by 
ethical standards but by combinations of workers, by legislation, and by free 
movement of labour, education, general social intercourse, and so on. The division of 
the world into nations, and above all the hardened separation of the core from the 
periphery, historically buttressed by the 20th century empires, solidifies a double 
system of wages: on the one hand the conventional wage of the metropolis, and of the 
middle classes of the periphery who aspire to global standards, and on the other the 1-
5 dollar-a-day wages, forty to fifty times below this level, of the great mass of third 
world persons. 
But this separation out of a dual wage system, maintained by rigid and racist 
restrictions on labour mobility, is yet another element in the perpetuation of an entire 
range of ‘backward’ techniques in the periphery. Beside the dual system of wages 
emerges the dual system of technology which some critics term ‘global apartheid’: 
cheap-wage-lo-tech in the periphery, hi-wage-hi-tech in the metropolis. 
The doctrine of equilibrium and the reality of technical change 
Pulling all these elements together brings us to a critical point, probably the central 
issue in the economic analysis of technical change. 
Brenner and his chosen adversaries alike, sadly, never won access to the central 
theoretical point about innovation. When, at any given moment, a capitalist introduces 
a new cost-saving technique, it is true that this brings an increase in profits without 
any increase in labour time – for this capitalist. For the other capitalists (or other users 
of labour) the effect of an innovation elsewhere is exactly the opposite. If we consider 
an Indian producer of cotton cloth faced with competition from Lancashire, what she 
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or he immediately faces is the ‘heavy artillery of prices’ – a steady, and during Sturm 
und Drang periods, dramatic – drop in the value and market price of the cotton cloth. 
It is a tremendous error to suppose that the Indian manufacturer will or can react by 
employing Lancashire techniques. There are three options: go bankrupt, cut wages, or 
make the employees work harder and longer. Generally speaking the course of history 
is follows these options in reverse order, using the threat of each to impose the other. 
Further, insofar as this modifies general conditions in India, it alters the moral and 
historical value of the Indian wage and Indian labour. It generally depresses the wage, 
generally raises the working week, and generally worsens all the conditions of labour. 
The introduction of superior, more modern technical conditions in one place, 
simultaneously degradates them elsewhere. Technnical backwardness is an inevitable 
product of tecnnical advance. The process of innovation does not produce an 
equalisation of profit rates, a convergence of technique and a homogenisation of 
social conditions but a dispersion of profit rates, a divergence of technique, and a 
heterogenisation of social conditions. 
Why, then, is this point not recognised – with the sole exception, as far as I can tell, of 
Ernest Mandel – by the participants in the dependency debate? Because the very same 
inheritance which blights the evolution of economics as a whole, has equally taken 
hold of the inheritors of Marx’s own economic theory: namely, the doctrinal creed of 
equilibrium.11  
According to the equilibrium view, divergences in techniques, in wages, and in profit 
rates can be treated as if they do not occur. They can be ignored and have no impact 
on the long-run course of history. This idea is theoretically absurd and empirically 
false, which is why adherence to it can only be characterised as theological.12 
Everything we have discussed so far illustrates its inapplicability to any rational 
discussion of development. 
Innovation itself requires investment, that is, capital. Brenner himself defines the 
process as ‘accumulation by innovation’. The divergence in conditions, precisely 
because it does not equalise profit rates,13 concentrates exceptionally high rates and 
volumes of profit in the hands of the innovators and in the industries and geographical 
regions – and above all, nation states – in which they reside. These industries and 
regions re-invest the surplus in further innovation, further widening the gaps. Finally 
the decline of wages in the areas where low technology prevails further extends the 
life of backward – that is, less productive – technologies, not just for years but for 
decades and in fact centuries. The cheap labour of great masses of people, just like the 
slaves of the Antebellum South, are placed almost in their entirety at the disposal of 
the innovating industries of the North, from which great masses of profit are extracted 
– way above what would be achieved were world prices to equalise out at the 
theoretical equilibrium – that are used to maintain and extend this advantage in 
perpetuity, or until such time that the social and political contradictions this generates 
call a halt to the process. 
This is a well-understood dynamic process termed positive feedback, and guarantees 
not only that equilibrium will never be attained, but that the actual path of evolution 
followed will systematically diverge ever and ever farther from the hypothetical 
equilibrium of the economists. 
The systematic and long-term dispersal of social conditions, and the polarisation of 
the world into two great blocs, is therefore completely explicable given only two or 
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perhaps three theoretical premises. The first is not really a premise at all but the 
removal of a dogmatic non-premise which stops us realising what is really happening: 
we must completely abandon the idea that any equilibrium will establish itself, or that 
the moving hypothetical equilibrium bears any relation to the real long-term process, 
and study the actual dynamic process. Given this – a leap which few are prepared to 
make – we need only suppose, first that the speed at which innovation spreads 
geographically is slower than the speed at which new innovations are applied 
industrially and, second, that the political division of the world into distinct nations 
with distinct general conditions of labour, will keep the polarisation of wages in line 
with the consequent polarisation of average productivity. 
Unequal exchange revisited 
(Final section to be completed) 
Ghandi summarised India’s economic status as follows: 
1. You English buy Indian cotton in the field, picked by Indian labour at seven cents 
a day, through an optional monopoly. 
2. This cotton is shipped on British bottoms, a three weeks journey across the Indian 
Ocean, down the Red Sea, across the Mediterranean, through Gibraltar, across the 
Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic Ocean to London. One hundred per cent profit on 
this freight is regarded as small. 
3. The cotton is turned into cloth in Lancashire. You pay shilling wages instead of 
Indian pennies to your workers. The English worker not only has the advantage of 
better wages, but the steel companies of England get the profit of building the 
factories and machines. Wages; profits; all these are spent in England. 
4. The finished product is sent back to India at European shipping rates, once again 
on British ships. The captains, officers, sailors of these ships, whose wages must 
be paid, are English. The only Indians who profit are a few lascars who do the 
dirty work on the boats for a few cents a day. 
5. The cloth is finally sold back to the kings and landlords of India who got the 
money to buy this expensive cloth out of the poor peasants of India who worked at 
seven cents a day. (Fisher 1932 pp 154-156; Source TBA) 
This is merely the political consolidation of a form which the world economy 
naturally produces. A disparity of 20-40 in GDP per head means, concretely, that the 
labour of the south exchanges with the labour of the north, ceteris paribus, in this 
proportion. That is, the product of 60 Indian labourers exchange on average with the 
product of 1 US labourer. One has only to suppose (the calculation can be done) that 
imported raw materials actually attained their theoretical equilibrium price or, in a 
Marxist framework, their world labour value, to grasp the extent of the subsidy that 
arises to the North. Marx quotation on this. Intensity of labour an insufficient 
explanation – this is not less intense or even much less skilled labour, which is shown 
by two things (1) immigrants are never worse than 50% less productive and 
frequently more productive (2) when hi-tech is properly transplanted to the third 
world accompanied by training or the use of a skilled section of the labour force (as 
eg in China) it immediately outcompetes. 
Hence this is primarily an economic law and not a political imposition. What, then, is 
the role of politics? On the one hand the forms of the state are products of the 
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underlying economic laws, in the sense that these laws determine the range of options 
that are practical. This the real content of the debate about transition in Russia. On the 
other hand, determined action by the state clearly affects the course of development 
which is why the decisive moments in capitalist evolution are all political events: 
The separation of the economic from the political 
With the arrival of capitalism, the ‘market’ separates out as a distinct institution from 
political forms. From this moment on it becomes nugatory to attribute to a merely 
political form the capacity to hegemonise social life. To the contrary the most 
successful political forms are those that adapt to the economic reality. History 
becomes the history of the interaction of territorial states with the world economy. 
The history of revolutions: why there were no regicides between 1649 and 1789. The 
classical form of the political struggle of 1700-1789 was the liberal battle for 
‘constitutional monarchy’, the creation of a specifically capitalist monarchy. Why did 
it not take the form of republicanism? Republicanism was not a doctrine but a 
politically-imposed necessity. 
The history of empire 
The history of US hegemony 
Summary of final part to be presented verbally 
The Dutch, English and French revolutions and the US war of independence; the true 
‘transition to capitalism’ 
The Prussian unification of Germany makes it an expansionist industrial world power 
Civil War the instrument of the defeat of the South and the rise of US to world power 
status 
Battle on the working day: imposed by state.  
The formation of the great empires; competitive imperialism. Consolidation of social 
states in Europe financed by empire. 
The Russian revolution, collapse or quasi-dissolution of the European Empires. 
The German response and the final defeat of German and Japanese expansionism. 
Deprived of expansion, Germany and Japan specialise in hi-tech, in technical 
superprofit. 
Removal of China from the sphere of operation of great power capital 
Postwar reconsolidation of anticommunist bloc under US industrial, financial and 
military hegemony; economic redivision of the world by the great powers (the losers, 
technical superprofit, the winners, commercial and financial superprofit. Conversion 
of the UK into a vassal state, 
Long boom; superiority economic superexploitation over empire leads to 
decolonisation as world norm. Triumph of Wilsonian liberalism. 
End of boom and long period of decline arising from the falling world profit rate 
The erosion of US supremacy under the impact of the end of the boom and the rising 
productivity of the ‘technical superprofit’ powers  
Turn and economic reconstruction of China; the ‘chinese model’ emerges. 
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US conteroffensive: destruction of the USSR, neoliberal offensive, financial 
exhaustion of the sources of world growth by US debt 
Ultramodernism, hyperextension and the Bush/neocon wardrive 
Bibliography 
Amin, S. (1974), Accumulation on a World Scale. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Amin, S. (1977), Imperialism and Unequal Development.  Sussex:  Harvester Press. 
Braudel, F (1979) Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme XV-XVIIIe siècle. Tome I: Les Structures du 
quotidien. Paris: Armind Collin 
Braudel, F (1979) Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme XV-XVIIIe siècle . Tome II: Les Jeux de 
l’échange. Paris: Armind Collin 
Braudel, F (1979) Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme XV-XVIIIe siècle . Tome III: Le Temps du 
MondeParis: Armand Collin 
Brenner (1974), ‘The Origins of Capitalist Development:a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism’ New Left Review  
Carchedi, G. (1991), Frontiers of Political Economy. London: Verso. 
Dobb, M (1946), Studies in the Development of Capitalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1946).  
Dobb, M (1950), 'Reply to Sweezy' Science and Society, XIV, 2, Spring 1950, 134-57,  
Dos Santos, Theontonio (1968), La Nueva Dependencia. (Buenos Aires: s/ediciones, 1968) 
Emmanuel, A. (1972), Unequal Exchange, New York: Publisher TBA 
Febvre, L. 
Freeman, A. (2004b), ‘The Inequality of Nations’ in Freeman, A, and Boris Kagarlitsky (eds) (2004) The Politics 
of Empire: Globalisation in crisis. London: Pluto Press. 
Freeman, A., Andrew Kliman and Julian Wells (eds) (2001), The New Value Controversy in Economics, pp55-67. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Freeman, A.. and Carchedi, G. (eds) (1996), Marx and Non-Equilibrium Economics, pp1-29. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Gunder Frank, A. (1967), Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York: Monthly Review Press 
Gunder Frank, A. (1969), The Development of Underdevelopment, in Latin America: Underdevelopment or 
Revolution, New York and London. 
Gunder Frank, A. (1972), Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment. Dependence, Class, and Politics in Latin 
America, New York: Publisher TBA 
Hilferding, R. (1981). Finance Capital, a Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul 
Hobson, J (1938). Imperialism: a study. London: George Allen and Unwin 
Kliman, A. (1988), ‘The Profit Rate Under Continuous Technological Change’, Review of Radical Political 
Economics, 20:2 & 3. 
Kliman, A.(2007), Reclaiming Marx's “Capital”: A Refutation of the Myth of Inconsistency (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books), 2007 
Laclau, E. (1971), 'Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America', New Left Review, No. 67, May-June 1971, 37-8  
Lenin, V. (1952). Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, in Lenin, V. (1952) Selected Works, vol I., 
Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House 
Mandel, E. (1978), Late Capitalism. London: Verso. 
Mandel, E. and Freeman, A. (1984) Marx, Ricardo and Sraffa. London: Verso 
Palloix, C. (1975), ‘The Self-Expansion of Capital on a World Scale’. Translated from L’internationalisation du 
capital. Paris: Maspero. 
Rostow, W (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960 
Sweezy, P(1950), 'The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism', Science and Society, XIV, 2, Spring 1950, 134-
57,  
Wahl, Jenny.(2001)  "Slavery in the United States". EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 15, 
2001. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/wahl.slavery.us; 
Wallerstein, E. (1974a), The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-
Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York: Academic Press. Volume I of a three-volume work of 
which volumes II and III appeared after Brenner’s article. 
2007 ICAPE Modernity of Backwardness Freeman.doc Page 28 of 29 19/01/2008 
Wallerstein, E. (1974b), ‘The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative 
Analysis’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, XVI, pp. 387–415  
Wallerstein, E.. (1974b), ‘From Feudalism to Capitalism: Transition or Transitions?’, Social Forces, LV , pp. 273–
81  
Weber, M. (1930). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Unwin 
Wells, J.P. (2001). ‘What is the distribution of the rate of profit?’. Paper presented to the 2001 mini-conference of 
the IWGVT at the Eastern Economic Association. 
 
Bibliographical References still to be precised 
Genovese, E (TBA), ‘The Political Economy of Slavery’ ref TBA 
Conrad and Myers (TBA), 
Williams, E. (TBA), Capitalism and Slavery. 
Spengler 
Fogel and Engerman (TBA), Time on the Cross 
Feiner, S (TBA) ‘Genovese and the Mode of Production Controversy’ ref TBA 
Lewis, E (TBA), The Theory of Economic Change TBA 
North, D. (TBA), 
Pritchett, L (1997) 
Maddison 
                                                 
1
 Cf Brenner (1974), and the references to Wallerstein Frank, and Emmanuel in the bibliography of this 
paper. The ‘dependency school’ – sometimes pejoratively (alsd unjustly and misleadingly) referred to 
as ‘neo-Marxists’ is not limited to these authors (including for example Amin, Palloix, Dos Santos and 
indeed Enrique Cardoso, but it is they to whom Brenner addresses his critique. The debate on the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism began in the 1940s with an exchange between Dobb 
(1946,1950) and Sweezy (1950)  
2
 In Marx’s terminology this is the production of relative surplus value, which increases surplus value 
by lowering the time required to produce inputs, instead of absolute surplus value, increasing surplus 
value by raising the time of labour. Absolute surplus value can arise either by extending the time that 
an individual worker spends at work, or by increasing the size of the labour force – during times of 
transition, by converting previously non-capitalist activities like serf demesne labour into capitalist 
activities by alienating the land (turning it into capital) and separating the labourer from the means of 
production (turning her or him into a wage labourer).  
3
 In short, American liberalism accepted the economic premise of European imperialism (the pre-
existing economic backwardness of their subject peoples) but denied its political conclusions (their 
unpreparedness for liberal democracy). 
4
 In many senses, a major mistake made by historians of left and right alike, in passing judgement on 
the Bolshevik tradition and of the USSR, is not to understand that its primary objective, and the driving 
force of its evolution, was imperialism, rather than capitalism. If the Bolshevism and its successors are 
judged by the standard ‘Did they achieve the defeat of European Imperialism’ (in which one must 
include the defeat of Nazism) instead of ‘Did they achieve socialism’ then their achievements become 
somewhat more impressive. In April 1945 there was little doubt left in the minds of any European as to 
how much of their civilisation would have survived, had the USSR not existed. 
5
 This has a quantitative dimension too: is backwardness a diminishing or an increasing aspect of 
modernity? From the Bolshevik point of view, under capitalism it was fated to be the condition of the 
majority of humanity: capitalist modernity was consequently intrinsically dictatorial on a world scale. 
The democratic principles proclaimed by capitalism could only therefore be achieved by replacing it 
with something else. 
6
 I define the ‘period of globalisation’ as the period of financial deregulation and world market 
integration which opened with the debt crisis of 1982 and continued with the transformed role of the 
International Financial Institutions and the reconstruction of the WTO into agencies of international 
governance, and which came to an end in the early 2000s with the new foreign policy of the Bush 
administration. 
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7
 I have referred to a variety of sources for the material published here but any errors are my own. 
Sources consulted include: Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, 
vol. 2 (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1958), 1026. United States Department of Agriculture, Atlas of 
American Agriculture, V, Sec. A, Cotton, Table IV, p. 18. ;Wahl, Jenny. "Slavery in the United States". 
EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 15, 2001. URL 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/wahl.slavery.us;William H. Phillips. "Making a Business of It: The 
Evolution of Southern Cotton Gin Patenting, 1831-90," Agricultural History 68 (1994): 82.; Phillips, 
William. "The Cotton Gin". EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. February 11, 2004. URL 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/phillips.cottongin, US census bureau URL 
http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab01.xls, UK spartacus schools project 
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